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1 Introduction  
In South Africa, section 6(2)(a)ii of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
1 
provides that it is a ground for judicial review if in taking an administrative action,
2
 
an administrator “was biased or reasonably suspected of bias”.
3
 This article 
examines the meaning and application of this ground for review. Bias or 
reasonable suspicion of bias equates with actual and apparent bias  
 
 
 
 
 
∗  Visiting Professor of Law, North West University (Potchefstroom Campus), Potchefstroom, South Africa 
and Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Rivers State University of Science and Technology, 
P.M.B. 5080, Nkpolu Oroworukwo Port Harcourt, Rivers State Nigeria. Contact: nwauche@hotmail.com 
or drtesn@puk.ac.za. The author would like to thank Professor Chuks Okpaluba and Eddie Maluleke 
for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.  
1  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, hereinafter PAJA. PAJA is the legislative compliance 
with the mandate of s 33 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and provides that 
everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.   
2  ‘Administrative action’ is defined as the threshold of every activity that is sought to be governed by 
administrative law. S 1 of PAJA defines an administrative action as a decision made or a failure to 
make a decision by an organ of state exercising public power or performing a public function or a 
natural or juristic person exercising a public power or performing a public function. It is important to 
note that between 1993 and 2000, when PAJA was promulgated, South African courts were embattled 
with the interpretation of what an administrative act is. What follows hereafter is an illustration that is no 
way definitive: President of the Republic of South Africa v South Africa Rugby Football Union (3) 2000 
(1) SA 1 (CC): The formulation of policy is not an administrative act; Permanent Secretary, Department 
of Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) 2001 (2) SA 1: Allocation of 
appropriate funds to schools is an administrative act; Mkhatswa v Mkhatswa 2002 (3) SA 441 (T), 
Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade and Industry 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC): implementation of 
legislation is an administrative act; Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 1 (CC): the exercising of legislative function is not administrative; Nel 
v Le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC), Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC): the performance of a 
judicial function is not administrative; Transnet v Goodman Bros 2001 (12) SA 853 (SCA): the tender 
process of government is an administrative act; and Claude Neon v City Council of Germistown 1995 
(3) SA 710 (W): an act giving rise to a legitimate expectation is an administrative act.  
3  Hereinafter bias ground for review.  
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respectively and reflects one of the rules of natural justice, the other being the 
right to a fair hearing.  
It is because no direct judicial interpretation of the bias ground for review has 
been undertaken by South African courts that I argue in this paper that there is a 
need for this interpretation and that what is at present applied as the test for 
administrative bias, namely the reasonable apprehension test enunciated in the 
case of President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football 
Union (2),
4
 is not suitable for administrators. The reason for this is that it is 
designed for judicial officers, which is evident in the presumption of judicial 
impartiality that underpins the test, and the consequently high threshold for the 
finding of judicial bias. I further contend that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test, as 
interpreted in the cases of BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and 
Allied Workers Union
5
 and S v Roberts,
6
 is suitable for determining administrative 
bias because it depends on the impression of the reasonable observer in the 
position of the lay litigant and makes no presumptions, judicial or otherwise. I also 
argue that this interpretation of the bias ground for review is the one that enables 
a lower threshold for finding administrative bias. This lower threshold is justified 
because of the importance of maintaining public confidence in the administration. 
I review and disagree with decisions in a number of cases where South African 
courts and administrative tribunals have recognized and advocated the need for a 
different treatment of administrators, resulting in a higher threshold of bias. I 
contend that the reasonable suspicion test does not adequate dealing adequately 
with all ramifications of administrative bias, including the issue of institutional bias 
and vicarious partiality. Accordingly, I construct a model for determining 
administrative bias that combines the reasonable suspicion test and the curative 
mechanism of administrative appeal, as well as some level of judicial review. This 
is exemplified by the jurisprudence of article 6(1) of the European Convention of  
4  President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union (2) 1999  
 (4) SA 147 (CC). Hereinafter Sarfu 2.  
5  BTR Industries South Africa v Metal and Allied Workers Union (1992) 3 SA 673 (A).  
 Hereinafter BTR Industries.  
6  S v Roberts 1999 (4) SA 915 (SCA). Hereinafter Roberts.  
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Human Rights, especially in the light of the contemplation of South African 
Magistrates’ Courts as a jurisdictional route for judicial review.  
In section two I review the existing jurisprudence for determining 
administrative bias in South Africa. In this section I examine the 
concept of actual bias and then consider the two tests of apparent 
bias, namely the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test and the ‘reasonable 
apprehension’ test. I also determine in this section whether the two 
tests are the same or differ significantly, and then consider how South 
African courts have dealt with the issue of institutional bias. In section 
three I construct a model for administrative bias and then consider the 
waiver of administrative bias in section four. Concluding remarks 
appear in section five.  
2  A review of the determination of administrative bias in South Africa   
In this section I review the existing jurisprudence on the determination of 
administrative bias. Two broad areas are dealt with below. The first is the test for 
determining administrative bias and the second the issue of institutional bias.  
2.1  The test for administrative bias  
Even though the bias ground for review stipulates bias or reasonable suspicion of 
bias, the cases examined below show that South African courts employ the 
reasonable suspicion test and the reasonable apprehension test when 
determining administrative bias. We shall now examine actual bias and then 
consider apparent bias.  
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2.1.1  Actual bias  
The nature of the formulation of the bias ground for review seems to contemplate 
a distinction between actual and apparent bias, even though South African 
common law does not distinguish between actual and apparent bias as English 
common law
7
 does. All allegations of bias are subjected to the test for apparent 
bias, even though conduct that would qualify as actual bias is more likely to be 
found in such a case. A few examples will suffice.   
In Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board,
8
 the blood relationship between 
the mayor of a municipality and an applicant who was one of the many applicants 
competing for a liquor licence before the local liquor licensing board was held by 
the court to be enough to create a likelihood of bias, especially as the mayor’s 
brother had won the licence. In Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation 
Board,
9
 the chairman of the Board was also a director of three powerful 
companies, one of which was the largest operator of taxis in Johannesburg and 
was opposed to the application which, if granted, would not have been to its 
benefit. The chairman refused to recuse himself and on review the court held that 
a reasonable man would apprehend that the chairman was biased.  
In Parag v Ladysmith City Council,
10
 the nature of the relevant interest lay in the 
fact that members of a licensing appeal committee were also holders of a general 
dealers’ licence. A member of a boundary-determining commission was ordered 
by the court to recuse himself in Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v  
7  See the case of Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759 where the court 
held that actual bias exists where a judge is a party to a case or has pecuniary interest in a case. In R v 
Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex parte Pinochet Ungarte (No. 2) [1999] 1 
All ER 577, the House of Lords extended this class to non-pecuniary interests where the judges’ 
decision would lead to a promotion of a cause in which the judge was involved with one of the parties.  
8  Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board 1944 WLD 52.  
9  Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947 (4) SA 272 (W).  
10  Parg v Ladysmith City Council 1961 (3) SA 714 (N).   
ES Nwauche   PER/PELJ 2005(8)1 
40/150 
 
Administrator Transvaal
11
 when it was established that he was also a member of a 
firm of consulting engineers who stood to benefit from the extension of the municipal 
boundaries.  
There is no doubt that personal interest of a financial nature will qualify as bias. 
Whether the non-pecuniary type of personal interest will also qualify will depend on 
the circumstances of the case. In any event, the stipulation that a reasonable 
suspicion of bias is enough to ground a review will take care of the cases that may 
be doubtful as representing actual bias. We now turn to the test for apparent bias.  
2.1.2 The test for apparent bias  
As was stated above, the second limb of the bias ground for review is ‘reasonable 
suspicion of bias’. In this section I intend to establish what this means. I shall first 
consider the meaning of the reasonable suspicion of bias test to examine the 
reasonable apprehension test and then determine the difference between the two 
tests.  
2.1.2.1 The reasonable suspicion test in South Africa  
The ‘reasonable suspicion’ test for apparent bias was laid down in the case of BTR 
Industries. In this case, the Appellate Division stated that:  
…in our law the existence of a reasonable suspicion of bias satisfies the 
test; and that an apprehension of a real likelihood that the decision maker 
will be biased is not a prerequisite for disqualifying bias. The test is that of 
a ‘reasonable suspicion.
12 
 
11  Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Administrator Transvaal 1961 (3) SA 669 (T). See also the case of 
Bam-Mugwanya v Minister of Finance and Provincial Expenditure, Eastern Cape 2001 (4) SA 12.(ck).  
12  N 5 at p 693. See also Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Monnig 1992  
 (3)  SA 482 (A) (hereinafter Monnig). See also Moch v Nedtravel 1996 (3) SA 1 (A) (hereinafter Moch); 
De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 (3) SA 340 (C);  
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The facts in BTR Industries are that in the course of a long drawn-out dispute 
between labour and the management of a company the President of the 
Industrial Court participated in a seminar arranged by management’s industrial 
relations consultant in which management’s lawyers all presented papers. In 
Roberts the Supreme Court of Appeal clarified this test. Howie ja said:  
The requirements of the test for the appearance of judicial bias are as 
follows as applied to judicial proceedings: (1) There must be a 
suspicion that the judicial officer might, not would, be biased. (2) The 
suspicion must be that of a reasonable person in the position of the 
accused or the litigant. (3) The suspicion must be based on 
reasonable grounds. (4) The suspicion is one which the reasonable 
person referred to would, not might, have.
13 
 
The court was quick to emphasise that:  
…if the suspicion of bias is one based on reasonable grounds the 
reasonable person would have it. If it were not so founded the 
reasonable person would not have it.
14 
 
It is important to note that many years after the Sarfu 2 test had been applied, 
albeit wrongly, as the test for administrative bias, South African courts and 
tribunals continue to use the BTR Industries and Roberts test. For example in 
County Fair Foods v Theron,
15
 the conduct of an arbitration by a CCMA 
commissioner was held to have raised an apprehension of bias because of the 
manner in which he descended into the arena in the questioning of the employee. 
In reaching this decision the Labour Court applied the test in BTR Industries and 
noted Sarfu 2.
16 
 
 Ighayiya Technical College v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Eastern  
 Cape 1998 (4) SA 502 (Ck).  
13  N 6 at p 924.  
14  Ibid at p 925. Emphasis original.   
15  County Fair Foods v Theron [2001] 2 BLLR 134 (LC).  
16  See also Afrox Ltd v Lata [1999] 5 BLLR 467 (LC) where the court applied the test in BTR 
Industries.  
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2.1.2.2 The reasonable apprehension test   
In Sarfu 2 the Constitutional Court of South Africa adopted the reasonable 
apprehension test.
17
 In the course of an action instituted in the Constitutional 
Court against Nelson Mandela, the then President of the Republic of South 
Africa, an application for recusal was lodged before the Constitutional Court on 
the grounds that the applicant had a reasonable apprehension that every 
member of the court would be biased against him, and that he consequently 
might not get a fair trial. The general allegation made against all the members 
was that their bias would arise because they had been appointed by President 
Mandela. Further specific allegations were made against individual members of 
the court on the basis of personal and political links with Mr Mandela. The court 
laid down the proper approach to the application of recusal of members of a 
court. The court stated that:  
 
It follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this 
application for the recusal of members of this court is objective and the 
onus of establishing it rests upon the applicant. The question is 
whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the 
correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or will not 
bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is 
a mind open to persuasion by evidence and the submissions of 
counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed 
in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer 
justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by 
reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that that 
they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or 
predispositions. They must take into account the fact they have a duty 
to sit in any case which they are not obliged to recuse themselves. At 
the same time it must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a 
fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not 
hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds on 
the part of litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, for 
whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial.
18  
 
17  This test has been adopted in Lesotho: Sole v Cullinan [2003] 3 All SA 466 (LesCA). For an 
analysis of this case, see Okpaluba 2004 TLR 1. It has also been followed in Swaziland. See 
Minister of Justice v Sapire (civ. App 49/ 2001, 10.6.02 unrep).  
18  Ibid at par 48. The court relied on the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v S. 
(R.D.) (1997) 118 CCC (3d) 353.   
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One of the distinguishing features of the reasonable apprehension test in Sarfu 2 
is the presumption of judicial impartiality.
19
 The other feature is that the 
determination of the bias depends on the court’s assessment of alleged evidence 
of bias, and not on the apprehension or suspicion of the litigant. An examination 
of the cases of BTR industries and Roberts shows that in none of the cases was 
the presumption of judicial impartiality used. That a new test
20
 is introduced by 
Sarfu 2 is evident in SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson,
21 
where the Constitutional 
Court in a majority judgment further explained the test. Speaking about the Sarfu 
2 test the court said:  
 
In formulating the test the Court observed that two considerations are 
built into the test itself. The first is that in considering the application for 
recusal, the court as a starting point presumes that judicial officers are 
impartial in adjudicating disputes. As later emerges from the Sarfu 
judgment, this in-built aspect entails two further consequences. On the 
one hand, it is the applicant for recusal who bears the onus of 
rebutting the presumption of judicial impartiality. On the other hand, 
the presumption is not easily dislodged. It requires ‘cogent’ or 
‘convincing’ evidence to be rebutted. The second in-built aspect of the 
test is that “absolute neutrality” is something of a chimera in the judicial 
context. This is because judges are human. They are unavoidably the 
product of their own life experiences, and the perspective thus derived 
inevitably and distinctively informs each judge’s performance of his or 
her judicial duties. But colourless neutrality stands in contrast to 
judicial impartiality – a distinction the Sarfu decision vividly illustrates. 
Impartiality is that quality of open-minded readiness to persuasion – 
without unfitting adherence to either party, or to the judge’s own 
predilections, preconceptions and personal views– that of a civilized 
system of adjudication. Impartiality requires in short a mind open to 
persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel; and in 
contrast to neutrality, this is an absolute requirement in every judicial 
proceeding… The court in Sarfu further alluded to the apparently 
double requirement of reasonableness that the application of the test 
imports. Not only must the person  
 
 
19  On the presumption of judicial impartiality the Constitutional Court cited with approval, the dictum of 
Cory j in the R.v S. (R.D) ibid par 117: “Courts have rightly recognized that there is a presumption that 
judges will carry out their oath of office… This is one of the reasons why the threshold for a successful 
allegation of perceived judicial bias is high. However, despite this high threshold, the presumption can 
be displaced with ‘cogent evidence’ that demonstrates that something the judge has done gives rise to 
a reasonable apprehension of bias.”  
20  See Okpaluba 2003 JJS 109.   
21  SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC). Hereinafter SACCAWU 1.  
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apprehending bias be a reasonable person, but the apprehension 
must in the circumstances be reasonable… The ‘double’ 
unreasonableness requirement also highlights the fact that mere 
apprehensiveness on the part of the litigant that a judge will be biased 
– even a strongly and honestly felt anxiety – is not enough. The court 
must carefully scrutinize the apprehension to determine whether it is to 
be regarded as reasonable. In adjudging this, the court superimposes 
a normative assessment on the litigant’s anxieties. It attributes to the 
litigant’s apprehension a legal value, and thereby decides whether it is 
such that should be countenanced by law.
22 
 
The minority judgment in this case brings into clearer relief the different 
approaches that are possible in the interpretation of the reasonable apprehension 
test. The dissenting opinion of Mokgoro and Sachs jj in SACCAWU 1 puts my 
argument in proper perspective:  
 
The test for recusal places a heavy burden of persuasion on the 
person alleging judicial bias or its appearance. But despite the 
presumption in favour of judges’ impartiality, the test requires an 
assessment of the litigant’s perception of impartiality… A judge called 
upon to decide whether or not a disqualifying apprehension of bias 
exists, however, should consider the apprehension of the lay litigant 
alleging bias and the reasonableness of that apprehension based on 
the actual circumstances of the case. As Cameron AJ points out, the 
lay litigant is assumed to be well-informed and equipped with the 
correct facts. But the lay litigant should not be expected to have the 
understanding of a trained lawyer and to appreciate the implications of 
the different nature of the appeal process. In both cases it will be the 
judges who decide and who must have an open mind. In all 
circumstances, the test emphasizes reasonableness in the light of the 
true facts, not the technical nuances of the particular case. It is our 
contention that the reasonableness of the apprehension also requires 
that the judge assess the lay litigant in her or his context.
23 
 
 22  Ibid par 15-18. See also Sager v Smith 2001 (3) SA 1004 (SCA). 
 23  Ibid par 56-58.  
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2.1.2.3  A comparison of the 'reasonable apprehension' test and the 
'reasonable suspicion' test  
In this section we shall determine whether the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test is 
the same as the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test or if they are different, and explain 
this difference. In Sager v Smith,
24
 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the use 
of the word ‘apprehension’ instead of ‘suspicion’ is a difference in terminology, 
which has no significance. In Sager v Smith,
25
 the English Court of Appeal stated 
that in an overwhelming number of cases the practical application of the test of 
reasonable suspicion and the real danger (similar to the reasonable 
apprehension test) tests leads to the same result.  
It is my opinion that in practical terms there are significant differences between 
the two tests. The difference between the reasonable suspicion test and the 
Sarfu 2 test lies in the weight attached to the perception of the lay observer 
compared to the determination of the court. While the reasonable suspicion test 
depends on the perception of the lay observer and is therefore grounded in 
appearance, the Sarfu 2 test hinges on the determination of the court, which 
relies on reality evident in proof of actual bias. Consequently, the Sarfu 2 test 
results in a high threshold for finding bias, because the court is unlikely to find 
bias as it presumes that it is unlikely to be influenced by acts that may ordinarily 
give rise to the appearance of bias. The Sarfu 2 test deals with reality, which is all 
about a court's confidence that it will not be influenced.  
The reverse is the case with the reasonable suspicion test. The reasonable 
suspicion test depends on the lay observer’s perception, which is far removed 
from reality. As Dr Malleson argues with respect to the difference between the 
reasonable suspicion test and the real danger (similar to the reasonable 
apprehension test) tests:   
24  Ibid at par 15.  
25  Sager v Smith 2001 (3) SA 1004 (SCA); [2000] 2 WLR 870.  
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Despite a certain amount of confusion in the case law over the 
distinction between the two tests, it is now clear that the key 
difference is that the latter requires only the appearance of bias, 
whereas the 'real danger' test requires that there is a likelihood of 
actual bias... in Locabail the court sought to play down the 
differences in practice between the 'reasonable suspicion' test 
and the 'real danger' test, stressing that in an overwhelming 
majority of cases the application of either test would lead to the 
same result. This conclusion glosses over the important practical 
effect of the real danger test in limiting the number of successful 
claims for disqualification in cases where the court is persuaded 
that the judge did not know of the matter relied upon as 
undermining his impartiality.
26 
 
The reasonable suspicion test therefore enables a lower threshold for finding bias 
and is therefore more likely to find bias than the Sarfu 2 test.  
2.2  A review of the application of the tests for administrative bias  
The cases considered below stress a lower standard for administrative bias, 
which is indicative of the fact that administrative officers and tribunals are unable 
to exercise the same level of competence as judicial officers. A lower standard 
would make it more difficult to determine administrative bias, because conduct 
that would have led to a finding of bias would be condoned. Thus a lower 
standard is akin to the high threshold that the reasonable apprehension test leads 
to. Using the 'real' apprehension test and a lower standard would result in a 
situation where it may be impossible to ever find administrative bias.  What 
follows hereafter are three examples of a lower standard for administrative bias. 
The first example of this is found in the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Commissioner of Competition Commission v General Council of the Bar of 
South Africa,
27
 where the court decided that the failure of an administrative body 
to observe the requirements of natural justice in this case – fair hearing – is not 
always indicative of bias. This case arose out  
26  Malleson 2002 Legal Studies 56-57. Emphasis original.  
27  Commissioner of Competition Commission v General Council of the Bar of South Africa 2002 (6) SA 
606 (SCA).   
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of an application brought by the General Council of the Bar in South Africa before the 
South African Competition Commission. The court explained that:   
 
… the present is but one of the very many cases in which an 
administrative body has failed to observe a principle which lawyers regard 
as elementary and it will be a sad day if, whenever this occurs, the body 
can be accused or suspected of bias. It is unfortunately one of the facts of 
life that administrative bodies perform their functions with varying degrees 
of competence. Sometimes, depending mostly on the expertise of their 
members and staff, they meticulously observe the requirements of natural 
justice; but often they do not, not because they are biased, but because 
they are not skilled in administrative law or inexperienced and know no 
better, or because a particular requirement of natural justice is simply 
overlooked. Thus the mere fact that audi alteram partem was not 
observed does not by itself justify an inference of bias.
28  
 
Even though the principle enunciated by the court is correct, its application to the 
facts of the case is, with respect, wrong. While it is true that the nonobservance of 
the audi rule is not indicative of bias, the court ought to have concentrated on the 
manner in which the administrative body acted
29
 as being critical in this circumstance 
and the basis of the appearance of bias.  The court even acknowledged that at the 
trial there was a stubborn attitude on the part of members of the commission, who 
were slow in realising the procedure to be followed in the assessment of the request 
of the General Council of the Bar and who felt that all that they had to do was allow 
the General Council of the Bar the opportunity to respond to the comments of the 
Minister. Indeed, the court said:   
 
Unless there is a change of heart on his part the prospects of the 
matter receiving proper treatment if it were to be remitted are not 
good.
30  
 
Again, here the court was swayed by what had really happened rather than the 
suspicion that the conduct of the administrative body had given rise to.   
 
 
28  Ibid par 16.  
29   Emphasis supplied.  
30  Par 17.  
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Another case advocating a different standard for administrative bias is the case  
of Kwazulu Transport v Mnguni,
31
 where the Labour Court adopted the test in  
Sarfu 2 and declared:  
The test accordingly sets a high threshold for an applicant in a recusal 
application to meet. Where that threshold is pitched may vary depending 
on the circumstances of each case and the forum where the application is 
made. Thus it will be pitched much higher for an appellate bench where 
the personal attributes, traits and dispositions of each judge is reduced by 
the collegial nature of such forum. Appellate judges are also entrusted 
with a higher level of judicial office and also generally more experienced 
in the craft of judging. For this reason it would be more difficult to have an 
appellate judge recused than a trial judge. Similarly, adjudicators who are 
more experienced in labour dispute adjudication would be able to resist 
an application for recusal more easily than those who are not. The 
probability of a reasonable apprehension of bias is greater if the 
adjudicator is less experienced or is imposed by the parties than when 
the adjudicator is more experienced or chosen by the parties… Even 
though the test may be pitched at different levels in the hierarchy of the 
dispute resolution system it remains the same in the sense that an 
applicant will always have to show, in essence, a reasonable 
apprehension of bias on the part of a party to the proceedings.
32 
 
It is submitted that no matter the level of the threshold that is set for administrators, 
the fact that the test is based on the Sarfu 2 standard would enable administrative 
officers and tribunals to determine apparent bias from their perception. However, 
where the BTR Industries and Roberts test is the standard of the reasonable 
suspicion test, the nature of the administrative tribunal or officer becomes one of the 
factors in the determination of bias. It is, however, submitted that in practice, the 
considerations as outlined in Mnguni are often absent in the perception of the party 
to a case. 
 
Such considerations smack of the presumption of judicial impartiality, which is the 
hall mark of the Sarfu 2 test. What difference would it have made to the  
 
 
31  Kwazulu Transport v Mnguni [2001] 7 BLLR 770 (LC). Hereinafter Mnguni.  
32  Ibid at 772-773. The facts of this case are that after a commissioner in the Commission for Conciliation 
Mediation and Arbitration was appointed the applicant applied for his recusal. The applicant contended 
that his had a reasonable apprehension of bias because the commissioner had represented his 
employees in litigation against him on three occasions.  
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perception of the party to a case if the CCMA commissioner sat with colleagues? 
Would the applicant have believed that the collegial nature of the tribunal would 
mitigate the bias of one of the commissioners? Indeed, it is even likely that the 
applicant may believe that the commissioner will go a long way towards 
influencing the other members of the panel.   
 
The fact remains that the court applied the BTR Industries and Roberts test even 
if it noted and adopted the Sarfu 2 test. This approach may in our opinion be a 
result of the difficulty in understanding the true import of the two tests. The ruling 
of the commissioner on the application for recusal is indicative of the two 
approaches. Rather than consider whether there were grounds for a reasonable 
apprehension, he sought to prove that the nature of the relationship between him 
and the employees were too far fetched to influence him. It was therefore correct 
for the Labour Court to have held that the nature of the relationship was such that 
a party to the case would readily apprehend that he would be biased.  
 
It is interesting that in adopting the Canadian case of R. v S. (R.D.), the court in 
Sarfu 2 specifically cited with approval the concurring opinion of L’Heureux-Dube 
and McLachlin jj
33
 to the effect that:  
 
 
33  N 5 par 32. Canadian jurisprudence differentiates between judicial and administrative officers 
in the application of the test. Justice Grandpre in Committee of Justice and Liberty v The 
National Energy Board [1978] 1 S.C.R 369 in a dissenting opinion at p 395 stated that: “The 
question of bias in a member of a court of justice cannot be examined in the same light as 
that in a member of an administrative tribunal entrusted by statute with an administrative 
discretion exercised in the light of its experience and that of its technical advisers… The 
basic principle is of course the same, namely that natural justice must be rendered. But its 
application must take into consideration the special circumstances of the tribunal.” In 
Newfoundland Telephone Company Limited v The Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities 
[1992] 1 R.C.S. 623, the Canadian Supreme Court said: “…there is great diversity of 
administrative boards. Those that are primarily adjudicative in their function will be expected 
to comply with the standard applicable to courts… At the other end of the scale are boards 
with popularly elected members such as those dealing with planning and developments 
whose members are municipal councillors. With those boards, the standard will be much 
more lenient.” This is the same position in Australia. In Hot Holdings v Creasy [2002] HCA 
51, Hanney j, who was part of the majority, was of the opinion that: “While the test for a 
reasonable apprehension of bias is the same for administrative and judicial decision-makers, 
its content may often be different. What is to be expected of a judge in judicial proceedings 
or a decision-maker in quasi-judicial proceedings will often be different from what is expected 
of a person making a purely administrative decision. One difference arises when the 
decision-maker is a Minister who is accountable to the Parliament and the  
ES Nwauche   PER/PELJ 2005(8)1 
50/150 
 
Although judicial proceedings will generally be bound by the 
requirements of natural justice to a greater degree than will hearings 
before administrative tribunals…
34 
 
…the facts and the discussion in Sarfu 2 clearly do not deal with the extent of the 
application of the test to administrative officers and tribunals.  
 
The third example of a lower standard finds expression in the consequences of a 
finding of bias. There is incipient jurisprudence that the finding of administrative 
bias should not lead to recusal, possibly due to the expense and inconvenience 
this will involve. This is a clear example of a difference between administrative 
and judicial bias. In Schulte v Van der Berg,
35
 Conradie j said:  
On the other hand, the nature of a complex administrative proceeding like 
s 418 enquiry is such that it would, in balancing the interests of individuals 
and the administration often be inappropriate to insist upon the grant of a 
remedy developed for and suited to judicial-type proceedings. The Court 
has to engage in a difficult balancing operation between the individual’s 
interests and the effect of recusal on the administration (and other 
participants in the administration process). Let me now venture upon the 
balancing act. An application for recusal of a commissioner on account of 
bias at the commencement of an enquiry would, generally speaking, 
cause less disruption and would, for that reason, be more favourably 
considered than an application such as the present one brought towards 
the end of a long inquiry where the aggrieved examinee has already 
given most of his evidence. Recusal as a remedy at this stage of the 
proceedings seems to me singularly inept.
36 
 
 electorate… Thus it will be ordinarily be very difficult to impute bias or reasonable apprehension of bias 
to the decision of the Minister who has considered all applications on their merits but made it clear that 
preference would be given to applicants who complied with government policy” (par 70). See also 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Leng (2001) 205 CLR 507 (Hereinafter 
Jia). Kirby j, who dissented in Jia and in Hot Properties, was not ready to concede: “[t]hat 
simply because of the political character of a Minister’s office and consequent accountability 
to Parliament, he or she was exempted from compliance with the law against bias or from 
answering to the courts on that ground, if bias could be established by the evidence” (par 
128).   
34  Par 40. Emphasis supplied.  
35  Schulte v Van der Berg and others NNO 1991 (3) SA 717 (C).  
36  At p 721.  
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Marais j was reluctant to follow the principle enunciated by his brother Judge, 
requiring further research and deliberation on the matter. However in Absa Bank 
Limited v Hoberman,
37
 Van Zyl j agreed with Conradie j when he stated that:  
…a court should, in deciding whether or not to remove a commissioner 
appointed in terms of s 418 of the Companies Act, have regard to the 
totality of the facts and circumstances underlying the competing interests 
of the parties involved. It should have a discretion not to remove a 
commissioner if it should not be to the general benefit of all interested 
parties to do so, even if it is satisfied that there is a perception of bias 
adhering to the commissioner.
38 
 
Van Zyl j had in the previous case of Ma-Afrika Groepbelange v Millman
39 
stated that 
the expense to be incurred and the inconvenience to be suffered in the appointment 
of a liquidator was a relevant factor in determining whether to remove the liquidator, 
even when the court was satisfied that he was biased. The expense incurred by a 
commissioner was not enough to deter Van Zyl j from ordering the replacement of a 
commissioner appointed under section 418 of the Companies Act.  
It is therefore submitted that the Sarfu 2 test and the lower standard being advocated 
for administrative officers in the application of the Sarfu 2 test are not appropriate for 
administrative officers. It is the reasonable suspicion test as interpreted to mean the 
perceptions of a reasonable lay observer that is appropriate, because it enables a 
lower threshold and an easier finding of bias necessary to maintain public confidence 
in the administrative system. This is a point I shall return to later.  
37  Absa Bank Limited v Hoberman [1997] 2 All SA 88. 
38  At p 106.  
39  Ma-Afrika Groepbelange v Millman NO 1996 CLR 751 (C).  
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2.2.1 Institutional bias  
The nature of institutional or structural bias is such that there is great merit in the 
contention that at least the manner in which the test for administrative bias is applied 
should be different. The nature of the administrative process is often institutionally 
biased in that in reaching a decision, the relevant body or officer has such an interest 
in the outcome of that decision that it becomes structurally biased. The critical 
question is whether the differentiated application would affect the finding of bias.   
Even though Lord Goff was insistent in Gough that the same test applies in full 
measure to administrators,
40
 subsequent cases
41
 and academic commentators argue 
that the test is different for administrative officers, especially in the case of 
institutional bias.
42 
 
In Monnig, the nature of the bias arose from the composition of the court martial of 
senior defence officers to deliberate on the alleged wrongdoings of the South African 
Defence Force. The institutional bias lay in the fact that that every empanelled court 
martial in the circumstances would likely be viewed as biased. The appellants argued 
that if the allegation of bias was upheld, the wide criminal jurisdiction of the court 
martial would be destroyed, something it was alleged would be contrary to the 
intention of parliament. The Appellate Division  
40  R v Gough (1993) 2 All ER 724 at 736-737. See also AT/T v Saudi Cable Corporation [2000] 1 Lyold’s 
Law Reports 22 (QB) and R v Gaming Board for Great Britain: Ex parte Beniam and Khaida [1970] QB 
417.  
41  See R v Hereford and Worster CC, ex p Wellington Parish Council [1996] JPL 573.  
42  See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action 546-548: “Closely related to 
the doctrine of necessity is that which permits public officials to exhibit certain kinds of bias in the 
exercise of their judgment or discretion on matters of public policy… The normal standards of 
impartiality implied in the adjudicative setting cannot meaningfully be applied to a body entitled to 
initiate a proposal and then to decide whether to proceed with it in the face of objections. What 
standards should be imposed on the Secretary of State for the Environment when he has to decide 
whether or not to confirm a compulsory purchase order or clearance order made by a local authority… 
or to allow an appeal against a refusal of planning permission? It would be inappropriate for the courts 
to insist on his maintaining the lofty detachment required of a judicial officer determining a lis inter 
partes. The Secretary of State’s decisions can seldom be wrenched entirely from their context and 
viewed in isolation from the government responsibilities.”   
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ruled that in cases of institutional bias, the manner to proceed was to hold that the 
right of recusal existed in favour of the affected citizen requiring the officer(s) to 
recuse themselves, unless there could be read into the appropriate legislation an 
express or implied denial of this right. The doctrine of necessity would justify the 
express or implied denial.
43
 The court noted that in this particular instance, the 
regular courts of the land had a concurrent jurisdiction with the court martial, and 
parliament therefore could not be regarded as having sanctioned the institutional 
bias inherent in the court martial.
44 
 
In Umfolozi Transport v Minister van Vervoer,
45
 the institutional bias here was that the 
state tender board could not be expected to be impartial in considering the tender 
from state owned companies. The court assumed that the reasonable suspicion test 
was applicable to a non-judicial officer and held that the institutional bias inherent in 
the state tender board was intended by the provisions of the State Tender Board Act, 
which did not prohibit the tender board from considering tenders by companies 
owned by the state.   
Professor Devenish criticizes the judgment and argues that:  
The difficulty with the judgment is the question posed by the judge. Surely 
the appropriate question is not whether the legislature intended the board 
to have the relevant competence, but whether the relevant rule of natural 
justice was expressly or by clear implication excluded or limited by the 
legislature.
46 
 
He equally points out an important step in the consideration that is introduced by the 
1996 Constitution. He argues that:  
Where, however, a statute by express words or necessary implication 
excludes the rule against bias, then such exclusion would  
43  The court adopted the opinion of De Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action 276: “An 
adjudicator who is subject to disqualification at common law may be required to sit if there is 
no other competent tribunal or if a quorum cannot be formed without him. Here the doctrine 
of necessity is applied to prevent a failure of justice.”   
44  See also Loggenberg v Roberts 1992 1 SA 393 (C); Dumbu v Commissioner of Prisons  
1992 1 SA 58 (E); Ciki v Commissioner of Correctional Services 1992 (2) SA 269 (E).   
45 Umfolozi Transport v Minister van Vervoer [1997] 2 All SA 548 (A).  
46  Devenish 2000 TSAR 397, 415.  
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have to be compatible with the provisions of the limitation clause set out 
in section 36 of the constitution, which states that the restriction to the 
right to just administrative action must be reasonable and justifiable in an 
open society based on human dignity, equality and freedom… 
47 
 
Another recent case of institutional bias is Financial Services Board v Pepkor  
Pension Fund,
48
 where it was alleged that the closeness of the relationship  
between the Registrar of Pension Funds and the Financial Services Board  
(FSB) was such that any tribunal of which a member of the FSB was also a  
member could not be impartial. The contention was that the Financial Services  
Appeal Board was a partial tribunal because it had as its members the  
Registrar and a member of the FSB. The court construed the relevant acts and  
held that the relationship between the FSB and the Registrar were not close, as  
the board had no power to override the decision of the Registrar and held that  
the test is whether:  
…a substantial number of reasonable and informed users of the Appeal 
Board would think that there was a risk of partial decisions being made 
because of the one member’s connection with the Board and the Board’s 
relationship with the Registrar… I conclude therefore that the presence of 
a member of the Board does not taint the structure and composition of the 
Appeal Board. It is my judgment, an independent tribunal as envisaged by 
section 34 of the Constitution.
49 
 
The court was mindful of the inevitability of institutional bias when it said:  
…it would wreck havoc with our system of administrative adjudication if 
internal appeals to a higher authority within the same hierarchy were to 
be impermissible simply because a member of the appeal tribunal has 
some measure of general supervision or control over the conduct of a 
member of a lower tribunal.
50 
 
47  Ibid.  
48  Financial Services Board v Pepkor Pension Fund [1998] 4 All SA 129 (C). Hereinafter 
Financial Services Board.  
49  Ibid at p 136. See also Freedom of Expression Institute v President of the Ordinary Court 
Martial 1999 BCLR 261(C).   
50  Ibid at p 136.  
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With due respect it is the reasonable suspicion that the institutional and structural 
links may lead to partiality that makes the issue of importance. It is noteworthy that 
rather than proceed to an examination of the issues as laid down in Monnig by 
seeking to find out if the legislature expressly or impliedly intended the curtailment of 
the right of recusal that arises in the cases of institutional bias, the court determined 
the nature of the relationship between the board and Registrar and then applied the 
reasonable apprehension test. The framework of the court’s decision was to identify 
the independence of the court as a means of making a finding of the impartiality of 
the court, especially as the question of institutional bias is involved. The court 
adopted the dictum of Lamer cjc in the Canadian case of R v Lippe
51 
that:  
The overall objective of guaranteeing judicial independence is to ensure a 
reasonable perception of impartiality.
52 
 
The court said of the dictum of Lamer cjc:  
He is speaking here not of apprehension of subjective bias but of 
apprehension of bias on an institutional level. The test for this kind of bias 
is stated in Lippe’s case… to be whether, having regard, inter alia, to the 
parties who appear before a decision maker, a fully informed person 
would harbour a reasonable apprehension of bias in a substantial number 
of cases.
53 
 
It is clear that even though the words ‘reasonable apprehension’ are used, it is far 
more akin to the BTR Industries and Roberts test than the Sarfu 2 test. Ross Kriel
54
 
describes the court’s reasoning as one which seeks to justify the institutional bias 
and it is submitted that he is correct.   
51  R v Lippe 5 CRR (2d) 31. 52  At p  
52.  Per Lamer cjc.  
53  N 48, p 135.  
54   See Kriel 1999 Annual Survey of South African Law 73.  
ES Nwauche   PER/PELJ 2005(8)1 
56/150 
 
2.3  Vicarious partiality  
An interesting dimension of administrative bias that is quite akin to institutional bias is 
the concept of vicarious partiality. Even though there is no decided South African 
case on the matter, there is no doubt that it will emerge in due course because it is a 
critical feature of all administrative systems. Vicarious partiality occurs when an 
impartial head of an institution on the advice and recommendation of partial 
subordinates makes a decision. The question becomes whether the decision is 
biased. This was what confronted the Australian High Court in Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Creasy.
55 
 
In this case, competing applicants applied for an exploration licence and made their 
presentations in public before the mining warden. After hearing their arguments the 
warden published his recommendations and his reasons. On the basis of a ballot the 
warden recommended that the appellant’s application be given priority. The warden 
forwarded his recommendation to the Minister for Mines, who subsequently took 
representations on the merits of the respective applications from interested persons 
and took advice from within his department. The departmental advice was contained 
in a minute and was signed by the Director General of the Department of Minerals 
and Energy of Western Australia. After a series of deliberations the Minister 
approved the Director General’s recommendation.   
The first respondents, who were competing applicants, sought an order of certiorari 
quashing the Minister’s decision on the basis that the decision by the Minister gave 
rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The alleged bias was the pecuniary 
interest of two officers of the Department who had been involved in the process 
within the Department that had led to the Director General’s advice to the Minister. 
Specifically, the interest was the holding of shares in a listed public company, which 
had an option to purchase an 80% interest in the exploration licence if it were 
granted to the company that won the exploration  
55  N 33.  
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licence. One of the officers involved directly held shares in the company, while 
the son of the other officer held the shares.  
The latter officer deliberated with the Director General to arrive at the decision 
that the department should advise the Minister to accept the warden’s 
recommendation. In addition, the other officer was present at the meeting and 
was asked to prepare the minutes, even though evidence was led to show that he 
did not participate in the deliberations. A subordinate officer prepared the minutes 
and it was presented to the Director General, who made some corrections before 
it was forwarded to the Minister. It was not contested that neither the Minister nor 
the Director General had any personal or pecuniary interest in the matter. It was 
also clear that the Minister did not know of the shareholdings of officers or the 
part they played in the processes leading to the advice.  
The majority of the High Court of Australia
56
 held that the impugned decision was 
that of the Minister who was the decision-maker, and he had no interest such as 
might give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on his part; he had no 
knowledge of the shareholdings of the officers and there is no ground to 
apprehend that he might have been influenced by a desire to promote their 
interests. The court agreed that the only ground for setting aside the Minister’s 
decision was on the ground of procedural unfairness, in that the exercise of the 
statutory power by the Minister had not been fair because of the presence of 
bias. The court further held that if the form of unfairness alleged was the actuality 
or the appearance of disqualifying bias, and that was said to result from the 
conduct or circumstances of a person other than the decision-maker, then the 
part played by that other person in relation to the decision would be important.  
56   Gleeson cj, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan jj.  
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The court therefore held
57
 that neither officer had played a central role in the 
decision-making process as they had made no significant contribution to the 
Minister’s decision and therefore their financial interest did not deprive the Minister’s 
decision of the appearance of impartiality. Hanney j formulated what can be taken to 
be a test of this dimension of administrative bias:  
A court will not conclude that there was a reasonable apprehension of 
bias merely because a person with an interest in the decision played a 
part in advising the decision-maker. The focus must be on the nature of 
the adviser’s interest, the part that person played in the decision-making 
process and the degree of independence observed by the decision-maker 
in making the decision. If there is a real and not a remote possibility that a 
Minister has not brought an independent mind to making his or her 
decision, the role and interest in the outcome of his or her officers may 
result in a finding of a reasonable apprehension of bias… Thus, the role 
played by an adviser is a critical factor in determining whether the interest 
of an adviser in the outcome of a decision taints the decision with bias or 
a reasonable apprehension of bias.
58 
 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia, whose decision the High Court 
overturned, dwelt on the apprehension of bias that the financial interest of the 
officer would give rise to, irrespective of the fact that the officer may not have  
 
 
57  The court adopted the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817. In this case an immigration officer who made a 
decision relied on the recommendation of a subordinate officer, who had examined the case and made 
detailed notes and comments and expressed opinions strongly adverse to the applicant. The court 
found that the notes and comments gave rise to an apprehension of racial and other forms of bias. 
L’Heureux-Dube, who gave the decision of the court, said: “Procedural fairness also requires that 
decisions be made free from a reasonable apprehension of bias by an impartial decision maker. The 
respondent argues that Simpson J was correct to find that the notes of the [subordinate officer] cannot 
be considered to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias because it was [the superior officer] 
who was the actual decision-maker, who was simply reviewing the recommendation prepared by his 
subordinate. In my opinion, the duty to act fairly and therefore in a manner that does not give rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias applies to all immigration officers who play a significant role in the 
making of decisions, whether they are subordinate reviewing officers or those who make the final 
decision. The subordinate officer plays an important part in the process and if a person with such a 
central role does not act impartially, the decision itself cannot be said to have been made in an 
impartial manner. In addition… the notes of [the subordinate officer] constitute the reasons for the 
decision, and if they give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias this taints the decision itself.” At p 
849.  
58  N 31 par 72.  
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had any significant part in the decision making process.
59
 The lower court urged 
that it is the appearance that matters and not the reality, which was painstakingly 
pointed out by the majority in Hot Holdings. Kirby j, who was the sole dissenter, 
mirrored the framework of the Supreme Court of Western Australia when he said:  
The question is not one of fine analysis. Instead, it is whether, looking 
at this decision by the Minister, and the participation in the steps that 
led to it of the two senior officials of his department, a reasonable 
member of the public might conclude that there is a real possibility that 
the decision could have been affected by the earlier participation in it 
of officers who, personally or through their immediate families, had 
undisclosed interests of which they were aware and these interests 
would be advanced if the Minister accepted the departmental 
recommendation.
60 
 
Thus, while the whole court agreed that the reasonable apprehension test is 
applicable to administrative officers, the difference lay in the interpretation and 
application of that test. While the majority believed that the content should be 
guided by the nature of the function to be performed, Kirby j held that the 
perception of the public is critical.  
59  Glesson cj, ibid, par 13 reproduced the opinion of Sheller aj, whose judgment was agreed on 
by the full court: “In my opinion, the holding by an officer in the Department who had taken 
part, albeit at the periphery, in the giving of advice to grant an exploration licence on which 
the Minister acted, of an undisclosed share interest in a company with a direct interest in the 
grant of an exploration licence must give rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on 
the part of a fair-minded and informed member of the public that the Minister, acting on or 
taking into account of such advice, which he believed was impartial, but which it could fairly 
be suspected was not, had himself for this reason not acted impartially.” The court agreed 
that the interest of the man whose son held the shares may not be disqualifying bias but that 
it strengthened the suspicion of the public.  
60  Par 132. Emphasis original. At par 145 he was more descriptive of the nature of the 
preferred interpretation of the apprehension: “The reasonable member of the public has 
neither the time nor the inclination to evaluate the detailed evidence and protestations such 
as have been made in this case. He or she, as a lay-person, simply sees a ministerial minute 
in which two senior departmental officers participated without declaring personal or familial 
pecuniary interest known to each of them. The ultimate decision is to be made by the 
Minister in the exercise of a largely unguided discretion.” In Jia, n 31 he said: “Being 
concerned primarily with the impact of events upon the persons affected and upon 
reasonable members of the public, what is involved is the general impression derived from 
the evidence, not a lawyers fine verbal analysis” at 552.   
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The interpretation favoured by the BTR Industries test is far more in accordance 
with the minority opinion of Kirby j in Hot properties. It is therefore submitted that 
this should be an adequate standard to deal with issues of vicarious partiality if it 
does arise in South Africa.  
To conclude this section, it is my opinion that even though the BTR Industries 
and Roberts test is far more appropriate in identifying administrative bias than the 
Sarfu 2 test, it is deficient in some respects. It is because of this deficiency that 
there may be a need to explore some additional steps that could serve to contain 
bias, because they would operate after the administrative officer or tribunal had 
reached a decision tainted with bias. Accordingly, in the next section I construct a 
model for dealing with administrative bias that combines the BTR Industries and 
Roberts test and the curative powers of administrative appeal and judicial review.  
A model for administrative bias in South Africa  
As stated above, I shall construct a model for assessing administrative bias in 
South Africa that combines the application of the test for bias as determined in 
the preceding section, the curative effect of administrative appeal and the 
curative effect of judicial review as exemplified by the jurisprudence of article 6(1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. This model is important in order 
to adequately provide a consistent basis for determining administrative bias. This 
model hinges on the use of the reasonable suspicion test, which enables a lower 
threshold of bias and consequently imposes a higher standard of conduct on 
administrators. It recognises, however, that even though an administrator may be 
regarded as biased, there should be curative possibilities, either through an 
administrative appeal or judicial review. This is especially true of institutional bias. 
It is to a consideration of this model that I now turn.  
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3.1 The curative powers of judicial review  
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
61
 provides that:  
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of a criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.  
It is submitted that the article 6(1) jurisprudence is suitable for South African 
administrative law, especially as Magistrates’ Courts are contemplated as part of the 
courts
62
 to undertake judicial review.
63
 The jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court to 
undertake judicial review is to be a general one or in respect of a specified class of 
administrative actions as designated by the Minister of Justice.
64 
 
In R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State,
65
 the House of Lords interpreted article 6(1) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and held that a case of institutional bias 
can be cured by the fact that the decision is subject to judicial review. In that case, it 
was contended that certain statutory powers of the Secretary of State in relation to 
planning matters, compulsory purchase, railways and highways were incompatible 
with article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. The 
decisions of the Secretary of State were subject to judicial review, but not to appeal.   
The complaint against the Secretary of State was that when the Secretary of State 
took a decision instead of an inspector appointed by him, the Secretary of State’s 
role in making policy meant that he had such an interest in the decision that he could 
not be regarded as an independent and impartial tribunal. The  
61  For a general account of this jurisprudence, see Forsyth 2001 CLJ 449.  
62  The other courts are the Constitutional Court and the High Court.  
63  The definition of ‘court’ in PAJA is substituted by s 1 of the Promotion of Administrative  
 Justice Amendment Act 53 of 2002.  
64  S 9A of PAJA inserted by Act 53 of 2002.  
65  R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State [2001] 2 All ER 92. Hereinafter Alconbury.  
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Divisional Court
66
 upheld the complaints, holding that the availability of judicial 
review proceedings was not sufficient to render the impugned provisions 
compatible with article 6(1). The House of Lords held that some administrative 
decisions affecting civil rights were taken by ministers answerable to elected 
bodies, and that where such decisions were subject to review by a court, regard 
had to be paid to both stages of the process.  
 
Thus, although the Secretary of State was not himself an independent and 
impartial tribunal in certain cases of the exercising of his powers, the crucial 
question was whether there was sufficient judicial control to ensure determination 
by such a tribunal subsequently.
67
 The court held that the jurisprudence did not 
require such a control to be by way of appeal on facts or merit. What was 
required was that there should be a sufficient review of legality of the decisions 
and procedures followed. The Lords further held that the judicial review 
jurisdiction of the High Court constituted such a review.  
 
The court based its decision on the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the case of Bryan v UK
68
 in assessing the sufficiency of the 
review available to the High Court:  
 
 
 
 
66  After acknowledging that the English common law required a different standard for administrators, the 
Divisional Court held that article 6(1) of the Convention had changed the position: “But the question we 
have to ask is whether the position under domestic law can withstand the unqualified procedural right 
conferred by art. 6. We do not think it can. The common law approach has inevitably been determined 
by the constraints imposed by legislation. The logic is that if legislation vests a decision in a person who 
is biased or provides for a decision to be taken in a manner which is not compatible with the 
requirements of independence and impartiality, no breach of the requirements of fairness could be 
found. Such requirements of fairness as there may be must be accommodated to the relevant statutory 
scheme. But the question now is not how art. 6 can best be accommodated in the interests of fairness 
given the existing statutory scheme, but rather whether the scheme itself complies with art 6. To accept 
that the possibility of the common law bias is inherent in the system and mandated by parliament is 
merely to admit that the system involves structural bias and requires determinations to be made by a 
person who is not impartial. It must follow from these conclusions that the Secretary of State is not 
impartial in the manner required by art 6 because in each case his policy is in issue. This is not to say 
that there is anything wrong with his role as a policy maker. What is objectionable in terms of art 6 is 
that he should be the judge in his cause where his policy is in play. In other words he cannot be both 
policy maker and decision taker.” p 955 (par 85-86).  
67  See Albert v Belgium (1983) 5 EHRR 533.   
68  Bryan v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 342.  
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… it is necessary to have regard to matters such as the subject matter 
appealed against, the manner in which that decision was arrived at, 
and the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual 
grounds of appeal.
69 
 
The principle in Alconbury was also applied in Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets 
London Borough Council,
70
 where the claimant presented herself to the defendant 
local housing authority as a homeless person. The authority informed her that it 
owed her a duty under section 193 of the Housing Act to ensure that 
accommodation was available to her. In discharge of that duty the authority 
offered her a secure tenancy of a flat but she turned it down, claiming that the 
property was unsuitable. Consequently and pursuant to statutory provisions, the 
claimant requested an internal review of the authority’s decision to offer her that 
accommodation. An officer of the authority, who rejected the claimant’s reasons 
for refusal as unreasonable, conducted the review.   
The claimant disputed the factual findings that were the basis of the reviewing 
officer’s decision and appealed to the county court, under section 204(1) of the 
1996 Act, which permitted appeal on points of law. The judge quashed the 
decision, holding inter alia that the authority’s failure at least to give consideration 
to referring a review decision, which turned on questions of disputed fact, to an 
impartial tribunal wholly independent of the authority was incompatible with the 
claimant’s right under article 6(1) of the European Convention to have her ‘civil 
rights’ determined by an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’.  
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the claimant appealed to the House 
of Lords, which was required to determine whether the reviewing officer 
constituted ‘an independent and impartial tribunal’ for the purposes of article 6(1) 
and if not, whether the county court, on appeal under section 204 of the 1996 Act, 
possessed ‘full jurisdiction’ so as to guarantee compliance with article  
69  At p 360-361.  
70  Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] 1 All ER 731. Hereinafter  
 Runa Begum. See also Adan v Newham London Borough Council [2002]1 WLR 2120. For an analysis 
of this case see Forsyth 2003 CLJ 244.   
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6(1), given that section 204 enabled the county court to examine questions of 
law. The House of Lords held that the reviewing officer did not constitute an 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’ for the purposes of article 6 of the convention, 
because as an employee whose personal impartiality could not be doubted, she 
was not independent of that authority when deciding whether the authority had 
discharged its admitted duty to the claimant. The court further held that the right 
of appeal under section 204 was sufficient to satisfy article 6(1), because the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights provided compelling 
support for the conclusion that for reasons of good administration, the absence of 
a full fact-finding jurisdiction in the county court to which appeal lay from an 
administrative decision-making body did not disqualify that tribunal for the 
purpose of article 6.   
 
Lord Hoffman further explained the contemplation by the European Court of 
Human Rights of administrative decisions as part of ‘civil rights’
71
 and what that 
had necessitated in the form of the curative appeal or review body:  
 
… from an early stage the Strasbourg Court has recognized that the 
extension of article 6 into administrative decision making has required 
… substantial modification of the full judicial model… It has said first, 
that an administrative decision within the extended scope of article 6 is a 
determination of civil rights and obligations and therefore prima facie 
has to be made by an independent tribunal. But, secondly, if the 
administrator is not independent (as will virtually be the case), it is 
permissible to consider whether the composite procedure of the 
administrative decision together with a right of appeal to a court is 
sufficient. Thirdly, it will be sufficient if the appellate (or reviewing) court 
has ‘full jurisdiction’ over the administrative decision. And fourthly as 
established in the landmark case of Bryan v United Kingdom …full 
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean jurisdiction to re-examine the 
merits of the case, but as I said in Alconbury… ‘jurisdiction to deal with 
the case as the nature of the decision requires’. It may be that the effect 
of Bryan is …administrative action falling within article 6 (and a great 
deal of administrative action still does not) should be subject to an  
71  See the case of Ringesien v Austria (No 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 425 and Deumeland v Germany 
(1986) 8 EHRR 448; Salesi v Italy (1993) 26 EHRR 187; Mennitto v Italy (2002) 34 EHRR 
1122: A 6(1) extends beyond private law disputes in the traditional sense of between 
individuals to all proceedings which are decisive of private rights and obligations.  
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examination of its legality rather than its merits by an independent  
and impartial tribunal.
72 
 
The House of Lords accordingly interpreted the county court’s review jurisdiction on 
the lawfulness and fairness of the council’s action as satisfying the requirement of full 
jurisdiction. In Bryan a planning inspector dealt with the issue of whether buildings 
erected in the Green Belt could be considered from their appearance and layout to 
have been designed for the purposes of agriculture. This was a question of fact and 
degree. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the planning inspector was 
not an ‘independent or impartial’ tribunal for the purposes of article 6(1). But it also 
held that the jurisdiction of the High Court was sufficient to comply with article 6(1), 
even though it could not substitute its own decision for that of the inspector – a 
critical feature of review – it was bound to satisfy itself that his conclusions were 
neither perverse nor irrational.  
Even though there were undisputed primary facts, the issue for the review of the 
court were the conclusions drawn from those facts. The court held that such an 
approach to questions of fact was a feature of the systems of judicial control of 
administrative decisions of the Member States of the Council of Europe and held that 
such an approach is reasonable in ‘specialised areas of the law’.   
In Rita Begum the House of Lords held that the distribution of welfare benefits 
qualified as a specialised area of the law. In the court’s opinion the appeal on points 
of law enabled the court to assess the reasonableness of the rejection of the 
provided accommodation by the applicant, which the county court could undertake 
even if there were incidental disputes of fact.   
Given the similarity between article 6(1) of the European Convention and section 34 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
73
 it is submitted  
72  Ibid, par 31-34.   
73  S 34 of the 1996 Constitution provides that: “Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court of law or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.”  
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that the jurisprudence of the former should be of persuasive authority to South 
African courts. On the one hand there is no doubt that judicial review of 
administrative action is not conceived in the same manner as in the English 
system, which requires lower courts to review decisions of administrators, which 
can then be appealed to the regular courts. The powers granted magistrates in 
South Africa could be designated in such a way that a review of the facts of the 
case for procedural fairness would satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
section 34. The advantage of this position is that it would be limited to cases of 
bias, so that the courts would not be flooded with cases and furthermore the 
Magistrate’s Court would only be concerned with the administrative procedure 
and not the merits. Finally, it would reduce the instances of judicial review before 
the High Court and the Constitutional Court as contemplated by PAJA. It is also 
important to point out that the challenge of this type of judicial review is to 
carefully circumscribe the type of administrative bias that could qualify. Cases of 
institutional bias or vicarious partiality would be good examples.  
3.2 The curative power of administrative appeal  
Given the different levels of the administrative structure in all legal systems, it is 
attractive to argue that issues of administrative bias can be cured by appeal 
within the administrative system. The Appellate Division in Monnig was urged to 
hold that the hearing of the Council of Review effectively cured the institutional 
bias in the court martial. It declined to do so. The court noted that in Turner v 
Jockey Club of South Africa,
74
 the opinion of Megarry j in Leary v National Vehicle 
Builders
75
 that:  
… if the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a  
fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought  
to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal … 
76 
 
74  Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1974 3 SA 633(A). Hereinafter Leary.  
75  Leary v National Vehicle Builders [1970] 2 All ER 713 (Ch).  
76 I bid at p720.  
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… had been trimmed and corrected by the Privy Council and the House of Lords 
in the cases of Calvin v Carr
77
 and Lyold v McMahon
78 
respectively, but declined 
to be persuaded by the new thinking because it involved principles enunciated in 
the field of proceedings of domestic tribunals of an unincorporated association 
which were unsuitable for a court martial. The court considered that even though 
composed of laymen, the court martial was akin to a court of law. It was therefore 
possible that, had the body in question not been adjudicatory, the Appellate 
Division may have been persuaded to adopt a curative principle.  
However, in Slagment v Building, Construction and Allied Workers’ Union
79
 the 
majority
80
 of the same Appellate Division agreed that an administrative appeal 
could under certain circumstances cure an initial lack of fair hearing. The 
circumstances in this regard would be a case where there is no adjudication 
before the action is taken and there is a full and fair hearing on appeal. The court 
would have come to a different decision had there been adjudication at the first 
tier.
81 
 
The facts of the case are that two employees who insisted on being heard 
together in a disciplinary hearing were dismissed after being given 45 minutes’ 
notice. The court held that this was procedurally unfair but that a subsequent 
hearing before another manager when they had had 12 days to reflect on their 
conduct and had sought advice was enough to cure the defect. Smallberger ja,  
77  Calvin v Carr [1979] 2 All ER 440 (PC). At p 447 Lord Wilberforce said: “(T)heir Lordships recognize 
and indeed assert that no clear and absolute rule can be laid down on the question whether defects in 
natural justice appearing at an original hearing, whether administrative or quasi-judicial can be ‘cured’ 
through appeal proceedings. The situations in which this issue arises are too diverse, and the rules by 
which they are governed are so various, that this must be so.”  
78  Lyold v McMahon [1987] 1 All ER 1118 (HL).  
79  Slagment v Building, Construction and Allied Workers’ Union 1995 (1) SA 742. Hereinafter Slagment. 
80  Nicholas aja, Hoexter ja, Grosskopf and Niebnaar ja in the majority. Smallberger ja differed inter alia on 
the question of the curative effect of the administrative appeal.   
81  The court distinguished the factual situation in Leary, where it stated that the observation of Megarry j 
was made in the context of “domestic and administrative two-tier adjudicatory systems… the present is 
not the case”. Ibid at p 756.  
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who differed from the majority, argued that the effect of the lack of an initial hearing 
on the dismissed employees is to place …  
…the burden of displacing an adverse decision... which for lack of  
natural justice (procedural unfairness) ought not to have reached.
82 
 
Even though given in the context of a lack of a fair hearing, it is possible to extend 
the opinion of the minority in Slagment to the issue of bias. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that the effect of the breach of natural justice, in this case bias, could be 
the determinant of the curative ability of the administrative appeal. If the absence of 
bias in the original administrative proceeding is such that an undue burden would be 
placed on the individual, the appeal should not be curative. One clear instance of 
such a burden is when the review is on the record and does not involve a complete 
rehearing.
83
 It may be far easier to prove that the appeal is curative if it is a review 
enabling a de novo hearing. It may be possible to also argue that the presence of an 
administrative appeal could be curative because that administrator was not biased or 
reasonably suspected of bias.  
The principle of curing by administrative appeal would not conflict with the bias 
ground for review. Indeed it will complement it in the sense that it will enable an 
interpretation that would seek to establish whether the existence of an impartial 
higher administrative officer would lead the reasonable observer to agree that there 
was no reasonable suspicion of bias.  
82  Ibid at p 761. His Lordship agreed that in exceptional circumstances, an administrative appeal could 
cure a defective initial hearing. It was, however, made clear that this would not be in the circumstances 
where the lack of a fair hearing is the fault of the dismissed persons. The minority stated that, in this 
case, the lack of a fair hearing was not the fault of the employees. See also Slade v Pretoria Rent 
Board 1943 TPD 131.  
83  See Slade v Pretoria Rent Board, ibid, at p 137-138.  
 
ES Nwauche   PER/PELJ 2005(8)1 
69/150 
 
4  Waiver of administrative bias  
The nature of the administrative process is such that citizens can be taken to 
waive their right to an impartial decision by administrative officers and tribunals. 
Public administration seems to contemplate this and in a sense it may be that 
citizens have no choice other than to embrace an administrative process that 
offers no alternative. It is valid to argue that the constitutional requirement of 
administrative impartiality is illusory given the widespread possibility of 
institutional bias. Indeed it may well be that PAJA contemplated the individual 
administrator without considering how institutions are relevant in this regard. The 
argument for waiver is indeed serious and may be counterproductive because of 
the fact that citizens may not have any choice as to how their administrative 
issues are handled. To further regard them as having waived this right may 
indeed be too much because of the inevitability of their action. It is therefore 
submitted that a waiver in such circumstances will indeed be unreal and unfair. 
The situation would be different if a citizen has a choice as to the administrator or 
institution. A selection in this regard could then be regarded as a waiver.  
It is further submitted that PAJA’s requirement of a reasonable suspicion of bias 
as the standard may do away with the question of waiver. At all times what is 
relevant is how the administrator or agency is perceived. It may well be that 
participation by the citizen in the process may assist the court in reaching a 
decision that there is no reasonable suspicion of bias.  
 
5 Concluding remarks  
It is hoped that the South African Constitutional Court will at the earliest 
opportunity interpret the provisions of section 6(2)a(ii) of PAJA in a manner that 
reinforces the BTR Industries and Roberts test. This will ensure that finding 
administrative bias is dependent on the reasonable lay observer and not on the 
determination of the tribunal, which is the hallmark of the Sarfu 2 test. The BTR 
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Industries and Roberts test reduces the threshold for the finding of 
bias and thus ensures the strengthening of public confidence in the 
administrative structures of the State.   
 
It is also my view that the incipient trend by the lower courts in South Africa to 
regard administrative officers as deserving a different treatment in the 
determination and application of the reasonable apprehension tests is reason for 
concern. While it may well be that this is a reaction to the Sarfu 2 test in 
recognizing that administrative officers require a different treatment, the manner 
in which this different treatment is advocated is such that it essentially condones 
administrative bias. This is the path towards diminishing public confidence in the 
administrative system. Public confidence in administration is as important as its 
confidence in the judiciary. The well-celebrated dictum of Lord Hewart L.C. in R v 
Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy
84
 that justice must not only be done but must be 
seen to be done, applies equally in my opinion to administrators. It is therefore on 
this ground that costs and expense should not be a reason for not disqualifying 
an administrative officer who is biased. If, in the process, an expensive inquiry is 
stopped, leading to great cost and inconvenience, so be it. The answer to 
concerns of cost and inconvenience is not to seek a change in the effect of 
review but to evolve rules that enable issues of recusal to be more easily 
detected administratively. In Hot Holdings, Kirby j adopted
85
 the opinion of 
Professor Carney that:  
Public integrity as an ideal which must be nurtured and safeguarded, 
describes the obligation of all public officials to act always and 
exclusively in the public interest and not in furtherance of their own 
personal interests. ... [C]onduct less heinous than that of corruption 
may ... betray this trust. An example of this latter conduct is when a 
public official acts in the course of carrying out official duties in a way 
which also promotes his or her personal interests. Acting in this way, in 
the face of a conflict of interest between one's personal interest and 
the public interest, constitutes a betrayal of the public trust. But even if 
no betrayal in fact occurs, it taints the decision and the decision-maker 
with allegations of impropriety. The dangers posed for the public 
interest by the existence of conflicts of interest on the  
84  R v Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy [1923] All ER 233.   
85   N 31 par 156.  
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part of public officials, whether the conflicts of interests are real or 
perceived to be real, demand the adoption of mechanisms which 
prevent such conflicts arising or which resolve them if they do arise.
86 
 
It is submitted that the concerns of Professor Carney apply to administrators 
everywhere, including South Africa. Indeed, section 195 of the South African 
Constitution declares the basic values and principles governing public 
administration. Paragraph (d) thereof states that “services must be provided 
impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.” In this regard it may be necessary 
to achieve this goal by introducing a model as advocated above.  
The possibility of curing by administrative appeal could also become a significant 
factor in the determination of a reasonable suspicion of bias. Thus a higher 
administrative officer or tribunal’s determination of the matter could lead a court 
to conclude that there had been no bias. The recent recognition of Magistrates’ 
Courts in the hierarchy of judicial review in the South African judicial system 
presents a good reason of assessing the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, especially as applied by English courts in determining whether to 
designate these courts as avenues for review as to facts of administrative action 
such that any administrative bias may be cured thereby.  
86  Garney 1991 Public Law Review 24.  
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